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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Andrew Wilson's motion to
suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December of 2018, an employee at a Pocatello fast-food restaurant who was taking
orders for the drive-through window allegedly became concerned because people in the car
Mr. Wilson was driving were laughing as they placed their order. (R., p.118; 4/18/19 Tr., p.5,
Ls.21-23.) The employee-Leo Eldredge-testified that when he told the people it would be a
10-15 minute wait for their food, someone in the car said, "We have alcohol in the car, so it's
okay for the wait." (R., p.118; 4/18/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-22.) Based on those two things, the
employee decided he should call the police. (R., p.118.)
When Pocatello Police Officer Malone responded to the call, he talked to Mr. Wilson,
who was in the driver's seat, through the passenger window of the car and told him he was there
to perform a welfare check because of the phone call. (R., p.118; 4/18/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-6.) He
testified that he noticed there were "at least four" people in the car. (4/18/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.1718.) Mr. Wilson told the officer that they were not intoxicated, but had just been "rowdy while
they were ordering food."

(R., p.118.)

While speaking with Mr. Wilson, Officer Malone

observed four empty beer cans on the "passenger side floorboard" of the car and smelled alcohol
but testified that he did not know if the smell was coming from Mr. Wilson because there were
other people in the car.

(R., p.118; 4/18/19 Tr., p.41, Ls.4-7; 1/9/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-10.)

Nevertheless, Officer Malone ordered Mr. Wilson to pull his car to the side of the parking lot and
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then had him perform field sobriety tests. (R., pp.118-19.) After he pulled over, Mr. Wilson got
out of his car, and Officer Malone testified that at that point, he could "smell the odor of
intoxicating beverage coming from his breath and person." (4/18/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.) He also
testified that he could see nystagmus in Mr. Wilson's eyes at that point. (4/18/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.911.) After the field sobriety tests, he arrested Mr. Wilson and obtained a search warrant for a
blood draw, which showed a blood alcohol content of .192 percent. (R., p.119.)
Mr. Wilson filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that he was detained "without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion." (R., p.58.) He also argued that, even if the initial
detention was lawful, "the subsequent questioning of the Defendant, the field sobriety testing,
and search of the Defendant was an unlawful extension of the initial detention, and there was no
reasonable suspicion for the police to extend the stop beyond the initial reason for the stop."
(R., p.58.) The State did not file a response to the motion. The district court then held a hearing
on the motion during which it stated, "I think the facts show [Mr. Wilson] was detained when
[Officer Malone] told him to pull over, so I don't think we need to cover that anymore."
(4/18/19 Tr., p.40, Ls.11-13.)
After the hearing, the district court asked the parties to submit briefs. (4/18/19 Tr., p.61,
Ls.20-21.)

In his brief, Mr. Wilson argued that Officer Malone did not have reasonable

suspicion to detain him when he did. (R., pp.82-90.) Subsequently, despite the fact that the
State had requested to file its brief after Mr. Wilson, so it could respond (4/18/19 Tr., p.67, Ls.620), it filed a brief that did not respond to his argument. Rather, it argued only that Officer
Malone was performing his community caretaking function up until the point that Mr. Wilson
got out of his car. (R., pp.97-102.) In making that argument, it implicitly conceded that Officer
Malone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Wilson when he did. It argued, "As
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soon as the defendant exited the vehicle and Officer Malone could smell the odor of alcohol
coming from the defendant and could see his glassy eyes it evolved from a welfare check to a
DUI investigation based upon reasonable suspicion given the circumstances. Once then (sic)
officer had reasonable suspicion he was allowed to extend the stop into a full DUI investigation .
"(R.,p.102.)
In its order granting Mr. Wilson's motion to suppress, the district court first addressed the
State's argument. It ruled Mr. Wilson's detention could not be justified as an exercise of the
community caretaking function, and the "consensual encounter" turned into a seizure "when
Officer Malone instructed [Mr. Wilson] to move his car from the drive through to the restaurant
parking lot." 1 (R., pp.119-25.) It then ruled that Officer Malone seized Mr. Wilson without
reasonable suspicion at that moment. (R., pp.125-27.) It stated, "Viewing the totality of the
circumstances, Officer Malone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant."
(R., p.127.) Therefore, it granted Mr. Wilson's motion to suppress. (R., p.127.) The State filed
a notice of appeal timely from the district court's order granting the motion to suppress.
(R., pp .131-3 3.)

1

The State does not challenge these holdings on appeal. (Appellant's Br., p.2 n.1.)
3

ISSUES
The State phrases the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court erroneously conclude the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that
Wilson was driving under the influence of alcohol?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
Mr. Wilson rephrases the issues as:
I.

Is the State's appellate claim not preserved because the State never raised the
claim in the district court and actually implicitly conceded the claim below?

II.

If the State's appellate claim is preserved, has the State failed to show error
because the district court properly ruled that Officer Malone lacked reasonable
suspicion to detain Mr. Wilson?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The State's Appellate Claim Is Not Preserved Because The State Never Raised The Claim In The
District Court And Actually Implicitly Conceded The Claim Below
In the district court, the State did not file a response to Mr. Wilson's motion to suppress
prior to the hearing on the motion. It also made no closing argument at the end of the hearing.
After the hearing, however, the district court asked the parties to submit briefing.
Tr., p.61, Ls.20-21.)

(4/18/19

In its brief, the State argued that Officer Malone was performing his

community caretaker function until Mr. Wilson got out of his car; it also argued the stop was
consensual in nature until that point. (R., pp.97-102.) It never argued that Officer Malone had
reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Wilson when he first spoke with him in the drive-through.
Instead, it argued that the stop evolved into a DUI investigation when Mr. Wilson got out of the
car because Officer Malone only possessed reasonable suspicion to detain him at that point.
(R., p.102.) On appeal, the State abandons this position and claims Officer Malone possessed
reasonable suspicion when he detained him originally.

(Appellant's Br., pp.4-9.) Because the

position the State takes on appeal was not presented to the district court, it is not preserved for
appellate review. In fact, this position was forfeited by the State's implicit concession in the
district court that Officer Malone did hot have reasonable suspicion to detain him when he did.
A party cannot change positions on appeal. In fact, this Court recently held that, "both
the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be
properly preserved for appeal." State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _

439 P.3d 1267, 1271

(2019); see also State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (citations omitted)
("'Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be
held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court."'). Additionally, a
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party cannot make an argument on appeal if it "forfeited the argument by its own affirmative
assertions, concessions, and acquiescence in the course of the litigation."

State v. Hanson,

142 Idaho 711, 717 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208-209
(1981)).
In this case, the only positions the State took below was that Officer Malone was
performing a welfare check-pursuant to his community caretaking function-that turned into a
valid DUI investigation when Mr. Wilson got out of his car, and the stop was consensual up to
that point. (R., pp.98-102.) The State argued, "Officer Malone was performing his caretaking
function when he approached the defendant to determine if he was safe to drive. Officer Malone
didn't block the defendant's ability to leave and politely asked if the defendant would be willing
to speak with him to make sure he was ok (sic) to drive." (R., p.102.) The State then implicitly
conceded that Officer Malone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Wilson until he
got out of his car: "As soon as the defendant exited the vehicle and Officer Malone could smell
the odor of alcohol coming from the defendant and could see his glassy eyes it evolved from a

welfare check to a DUI investigation based upon reasonable suspicion given the circumstances."
(R., p.102 (emphasis added).)
The State's strategy of arguing that the stop was consensual until Mr. Wilson got out of
his car was also evident in its questioning of Officer Malone at the hearing. For example, after
Officer Malone testified that he "asked Mr. Wilson to pull over to the side of the parking lot so
[he] could check his eyes to verify he was safe to drive," the State asked, "Did he do so
willingly?" (4/18/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-15.) Similarly, some of the State's subsequent questioning
went as follows:
Q:

So when you asked him to pull over, did he ever take issue with that?
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A:

No.

Q:

When you told him you wanted to make sure he was safe to drive, what
was his response?

A:

He agreed to do so.

Q:

Did he seem to have an attitude about that?

A:

Not at all. He was very cooperative.

(4/18/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9.)
On appeal, however, the State concedes the community caretaking argument and argues
instead that Officer Malone possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Wilson "[ a ]t the time
the officer told Wilson to pull into the parking lot .... " (Appellant's Br., p.2 n.l, pp.5-9.) This
was not the State's position in the district court. Moreover, Hanson makes it clear that the State
forfeited this argument on appeal as a result of its implicit concession below.
In fact, this case is similar to State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717 (2017). There, the State
conceded in its briefing before the district court that Mr. Cohagan was unlawfully seized, but it
argued on appeal that the Court should decide whether the seizure was lawful. Id. at 721. The
Court stated, "To allow the State to change positions on appeal and argue that the stop was not
illegal would sharply cut against our longstanding and recently re-affirmed policy of requiring
parties to present their arguments to the court below .... " Id.
This is precisely what happened in this case. In the district court, the State never argued
that Officer Malone had reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Wilson when he did. It only argued
that the initial stop was consensual and justified by the community caretaking function, and it
conceded that Officer Malone did not possess reasonable suspicion until Mr. Wilson got out of
his car after he was seized. (R., pp.98-102.) On appeal, the State does not challenge the district
court's rulings that Mr. Wilson was seized at the moment Officer Malone told him to pull over,
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and that his seizure could not be justified by the community caretaking function. (Appellant's
Br., p.2 n.1.) Therefore, it has waived the only claim it preserved below. Nevertheless, it now
takes an entirely different position on appeal. Because the State never took this position in the
district court, and indeed conceded such a position, the State's appellate claim is unpreserved and
forfeited.

II.
If The State's Appellate Claim Is Preserved, The State Has Failed To Show Error Because The
District Court Properly Held That Officer Malone Lacked Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Wilson Was Driving Under The Influence
A.

Introduction
The district court properly ruled that Officer Malone unlawfully seized Mr. Wilson.

Neither the totality of the circumstances, nor the inferences that could be drawn from those
circumstances, established reasonable suspicion that Mr. Wilson was engaged in criminal
activity at the time he was seized.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a "district court's order granting a motion to suppress usmg a

bifurcated standard ofreview." It "accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light
of those facts." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014) (internal citation omitted). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995).
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C.

The State Has Failed To Meet Its Burden To Overcome The Presumption That
Mr. Wilson's Seizure Was Unlawful
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that a seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement and was
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Halen, 136
Idaho at 833. If the government fails to meet that burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the
illegal seizure, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegality, is
inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 518-19 (2012).
Unless the facts available to an officer at the time "give rise to reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot," an investigative detention is an illegal seizure. See State v. Stewart,
145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity "must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn
from those facts." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
"[r]easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch" and more than ''unparticularized
suspicion." Id. Finally, even if an investigative detention is lawfully undertaken, in all cases it
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
The State has not met its burden to overcome the presumption that Mr. Wilson's
warrantless seizure was unlawful. Mr. Wilson's detention was a fishing expedition based on
unparticularized suspicion, and it lasted longer than necessary to perform a welfare check, which
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was the stated purpose of the stop. Thus, the district court properly ruled that the totality of the
circumstances did not provide Officer Malone with reasonable suspicion that Mr. Wilson was
driving under the influence.

(R., p.127.) First, the call from Mr. Eldredge was vague and

unjustified. He testified that he heard the people in the car laughing, which he said is ''usually a
sign of something." (4/18/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.21-23.) It will be a sorry day indeed when laughter is a
suspicious activity. He also testified that someone in the car said there was "alcohol" in the car.
(4/18/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.24-25, p.9, Ls.21-22.) Of course, Mr. Eldredge did not know which one of
the people in the car said that.

(4/18/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-13.)

Further, he never witnessed

Mr. Wilson drinking alcohol, and indeed there were no facts presented to Officer Malone that
Mr. Wilson was actually drinking alcohol. Therefore, nothing about the phone call established
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In fact, at the time he decided to detain Mr. Wilson, Officer Malone had nothing more
than a hunch. It was not until after he unlawfully seized Mr. Wilson that he smelled alcohol on
his person and detected nystagmus when looking at his eyes. (4/18/19 Tr., p.21, L. 11 - p.22,
L.11.) As such, the totality of the circumstances here only provided Officer Malone with a
hunch because at the time he seized Mr. Wilson, he had nothing more than incipient and
unparticularized suspicion. He witnessed no driving pattern that would indicate Mr. Wilson was
intoxicated. Mr. Eldredge never observed Mr. Wilson's driving either, and there were several
other people in the car. Therefore, Officer Malone could only venture a guess that Mr. Wilson
was consuming alcohol. This was simply not enough to allow him to seize Mr. Wilson without a
warrant.
Further, the cases the State relies on to argue Officer Malone possessed reasonable
suspicion in this case are readily distinguishable, and do not stand for the rule the State proposes.
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For example, the State relies on State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508 (Ct. App. 2000) to argue that
suspicion is reasonable when someone is ''within the scope of persons who may be involved in
the criminal activity .... " (Appellant's Br., pp.7-9.) This is wrong. As this Court recently
stated, "' An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is committing a
crime."' State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, _ , 450 P.3d 315, 322 (2019) (quoting Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528

U.S.

119,

124

(2000)).

The

Gonzales

Court

also

noted that,

"an

individual's proximity to others suspected of or associated with criminal activity, without more,
is also insufficient." Id. (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).
Moreover, the facts of Zentner are entirely different than those of this case. In Zentner,
the officer originally turned on her vehicle's overhead lights because she noticed that a car's
taillights were broken. 134 Idaho at 509. However, the driver did not pull over immediately.
And the officer observed that all the occupants of the car were "moving around excessively"
before the driver eventually pulled over. Id. Once the car stopped, the driver "could not produce
a driver's license, proof of insurance or a vehicle registration." Id. Further, during the stop,
dispatch informed the officer that the "license plates were registered to a different automobile."
Id. And when the officer asked the driver to get out of the vehicle, he admitted that one of his

passengers possessed a "stun gun." Id. Based on that information, the officer began to frisk
another passenger, and he admitted he had contraband in his pocket. Id.

Additionally, the

officer subsequently noticed a "bag containing a powder substance in a hole in the front
dashboard."

Id.

When another officer arrived, he found the bag in the dashboard and

determined it contained methamphetamine; he also found a backpack in the backseat where
Mr. Zentner had been sitting. Id. A search of the backpack revealed additional contraband. Id.
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Therefore, Mr. Zentner was arrested and methamphetamine was found on his person at the jail.
Id.

On appeal, Mr. Zentner argued that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. The
Court of Appeals held the arrest was proper because of the facts "known to officers at the time of
Zentner's arrest," which "include[d] not only the proximity of the backpack to Zentner as he was
situated in the backseat of the vehicle, but also Deputy Knisley's observation, while attempting
to stop the vehicle, that all three occupants were moving excessively about the interior of the car
for a period before the driver finally brought the vehicle to a stop." Id. at 511. The court
determined that due to "this excessive activity, followed by the discovery of drugs in the
automobile, an officer could reasonably infer that all of the occupants had been taking steps to
conceal the contraband in the car." Id. It went on to hold that, "This evidence, together with
Zentner' s physical position on the seat next to the backpack, would lead a prudent person to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Zentner had knowledge and control of the
contraband in the backpack." Id.
No such facts existed in this case. Indeed, because the facts of Zentner are so dissimilar,
the case is not in any way "instructive" as the State argues. (Appellant's Br., p.7.) Unlike
Zentner, the only thing Officer Malone knew when he approached the passenger side of the car

was there had been an uncorroborated tip that occupants of a car were laughing and said they had
"alcohol." When he approached the car, there was no indication that any of the occupants were
acting suspiciously or furtively.

Officer Malone saw empty beer cans and smelled alcohol

through the passenger window, but there was no indication the beer cans were next to
Mr. Wilson, as the backpack was in Zentner. Rather, Officer Malone testified that they were on
the passenger side floorboard. (4/18/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.15-20; 1/9/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-10.) Further,
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in Zentner, the officer observed driving and equipment problems, which formed the basis for the
stop. Here, Officer Malone did not observe driving. In fact, he never observed anything out of
the ordinary about Mr. Wilson until after he seized him. He arrived on the scene solely because
of a "tip" from a zealous drive-through employee who allegedly heard someone in the car say
they had "alcohol." Zentner is not instructive in a situation like this, and Officer Malone went
well beyond whatever the original purpose of his appearance was.
Therefore, the district court properly ruled that the facts available to Officer Malone
when he seized Mr. Wilson did not provide reasonable suspicion because, based on those facts
alone, Officer Malone could not reasonably infer that Mr. Wilson had been drinking and driving.
Therefore, the district court correctly granted Mr. Wilson's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting
his motion to suppress.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2020.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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